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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3460 
 ___________ 
 
 DEBORAH M. YOUNG, NATURAL GUARDIAN OF C.D. AND B.D.,  
MINORS, IN OUR OWN RIGHT, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
ALICE BECK DUBOW, JUDGE, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY FOR CAUSING 
PROLONGED CHILD ABUSE BY FAILING TO ENFORCE HER VERY OWN 
"STANDING ORDER FOR COURTROOM H" RULES; ANGELE MARIE PARKER, 
CEO; CHEREL FERRELL, SOCIAL WORKER EMPLOYEE METHODIST 
SERVICES FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN ("METHODIST KINSHIP") IN THEIR 
INDIVIDUAL, AND FEDERAL GRANT FUNDED CAPACITIES AS 
BENEFICIARIES OF KIDNAP FOR PROFIT AND PROLONGED CHILD ABUSE; 
ANNE MARIE AMBROSE, COMMISSIONER DHS; KAREN S. REYNOLDS, 
SOCIAL WORKER; CARLA N. GARDNER, COMMISSIONER'S RESPONSE 
PHILADEPHIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES ("DHS") IN THEIR 
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES AND COMPLICIT ACCESSORIES TO KIDNAP FOR 
PROFIT AND PROLONGED CHILD ABUSE; MARY ANN TAYLOR, IN HER 
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS MENTAL AND PHYSICAL CHILD ABUSER, AND 
ACCOMPLICE BENEFICIARY OF KIDNAP FOR PROFIT AND PROLONGED 
CHILD ABUSE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-05015) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 16, 1020 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
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 (Opinion filed:  January 3, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Deborah Young, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing 
her complaint.  Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm. 
I 
 In November 2009, Young filed in the District Court a complaint against 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge Alice Dubow, officials at the Philadelphia 
Department of Human Services (“DHS”), employees of Methodist Kinship, an 
organization that provides child placement services for DHS, and Mary Ann Taylor, her 
children’s paternal grandmother.  Her complaint stemmed from Judge Dubow’s order 
awarding custody of Young’s two children to their father and Taylor.  Young alleged that 
Judge Dubow’s decision “ordered kidnap for profit and prolonged child abuse of [her 
children],” D. Ct. Doc. No. 3, 3, and accused the remaining defendants of contributing to 
the alleged kidnap and abuse of her children.  Young sought the return of her children to 
her custody and $900,000 in punitive damages. 
 The Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the District Court granted.  Young 
then filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may summarily affirm the 
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District Court’s order if Young’s appeal does not present a substantial question.  See 3d 
Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. IOP 10.6.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  See Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey, 588 
F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009).  “The District Court's judgment is proper only if, accepting 
all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to 
[Young], we determine that [she] is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of 
the complaint.”  Id. (quoting McGovern v. Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 
2009)).   
 The District Court presented several alternative bases for dismissing Young’s 
complaint.  We need only address two of these.  First, we agree with the District Court 
that Young’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Dist. of Columbia 
Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923).  “In certain circumstances, where a federal suit follows a state suit, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine prohibits the district court from exercising jurisdiction.”  Great W. 
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2010).  
There are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply:  
“(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused 
by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit 
was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state 
judgments.” Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 
280, 284 (2005)).  Here, there is no question that these requirements are met.  Young’s 
federal complaint stemmed from the adverse custody decision rendered in state court, 
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Young claims that she and her children have been harmed by that decision, and she 
expressly asks the District Court to reverse Judge Dubow’s custody award.  See also 
Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 153 (3d Cir. 2004) (mother’s action for a declaratory 
judgment invalidating Office of Children and Youth’s findings concerning the absence of 
child abuse necessarily implied a finding that Court of Common Pleas made improper 
custody award, and was thus barred by Rooker-Feldman). 
 To the extent that Young raised claims that would not be barred by Rooker-
Feldman, we also agree with the District Court that her allegations were insufficient to 
state a claim for which relief could be granted.  To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 
1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “A 
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  
Id.  Here, Young raised a number of allegations against the Defendants, but failed to 
provide factual support for those allegations. 
 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. 
